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Abstract
The contribution examines Goodman’s conception of philosophy, in particular his remark 
that his project can be understood as a «critique of worldmaking». It is argued that, despite 
dealing with epistemological questions, the general theory of symbols and worldmaking 
does not answer them. Rather, it can be conceived as a practical conception comparable 
to Kant’s critique of reason or to Wittgenstein’s critique of language games, i. e., as a 
philosophy of world orient ation. It is claimed that Goodman himself could not artic ulate 
this dimension of his position appropriately as he kept using the language of epistemol-
ogy. Yet many aspects of his thinking become much clearer if they are interpreted with in 
a non-epistemological frame.
Keywords: Goodman; symbol theory; worldmaking; world orientation; world disclosure.
Resumen. ¿Qué es la «crítica de la construcción de mundos»? La concepción de la filosofía de 
Nelson Goodman
Esta contribución examina la concepción de la filosofía de Goodman, concretamente su 
afirmación de que su proyecto puede entenderse como una «crítica de la construcción de 
mundos». Se argumenta que, a pesar de tratar cuestiones epistemológicas, la teoría general 
de los símbolos y de la construcción de mundos no las contesta. Más bien se puede conside-
rar como una concepción práctica comparable a la crítica de la razón de Kant o a la crítica 
de los juegos del lenguaje de Wittgenstein, esto es, como una filosofía de la orientación 
del mundo. Se defiende que Goodman no podría haber articulado esta dimensión de su 
postura de un modo apropiado puesto que siguió usando el lenguaje de la epistemología. 
Ahora bien, muchos aspectos de su pensamiento son mucho más claros si se interpretan 
en un marco no epistemológico.
Palabras clave: Goodman; teoría de los símbolos; construcción de mundos; orientación 
del mundo; apertura del mundo.
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1. Introduction
In Ways of Worldmaking, Nelson Goodman describes his philosophical project 
as a critique of worldmaking: «Worlds are made by making [...] versions with 
words, numerals, pictures, sounds, or other symbols of any kind in any medi-
um; and the comparative study of these versions and visions and of their 
making is what I call a critique of worldmaking» (WW, 94). Elsewhere Good-
man says that his «main under taking [...] is examination and compar ison of 
the ways we make what we make — call them versions or worlds as you like 
— and of the criteria we use in judging what we make» (MM, 43). — What 
does the label «critique of world making» exactly mean? What is the conception 
of philo sophy Goodman has in mind? And how do we have to interpret his 
general symbol theory if it is primarily a critique of world making?
It is tempting to think that «critique of world making» is just a different 
label for «epi stemology», only that its scope is broader. One basic assumption 
of this article, though, is that Goodman is not engaged in epistemology at all, 
at least not in the usual sense. The question is not whether epistemology has 
to be conceived narrow or broad. Symbol theory is not so much a theory but 
rather a practical conception, a certain technique of thinking. This might seem 
rather far-fetched at first sight, as Goodman more than once emphasizes that 
a philosopher «is driven not by practical needs but by an impractical desire to 
understand» (PP, 169). Even though he discovers language practice as a fun-
damental point of reference in his theory of induction (especially, FFF, 4.3-
4.4), he never takes into account the details of the pragmatic dimension of 
sign use and everyday language (Goodman, 1996, 205). His refusal to go into 
questions of ethical rightness (WW, 109, Fn. 1) only underlines a general lack 
of normative discussion in Good man’s work. Therefore one is inclined to 
perceive his «general theory of under stand ing» (R, 53) as a general theory of 
knowl edge, an extended epistemological con ception concerned with «under-
standing or cog nition in all of its modes» (R, 4). Accordingly, rightness is taken 
to be Goodman’s epi stemo logical criterion, representing the standard to sep-
arate acceptable from inacceptable world descriptions. Right ness takes the 
place of truth, only that it is, «unlike truth, [...] multi dimen sional» (R, 156). 
The expressions may have changed, but the project is still the same.
Here, this perspective is called into question. Goodman, to be sure, uses 
the vocabulary of epistemology and he starts with the problems of epistemol-
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ogy. Still, many elements of his thinking become much clearer if they are 
interpreted in a frame beyond epistemology. His philosophy is done more 
justice if one presupposes that it does not answer to epistemological questions. 
In order to show this, I will first examine some of Goodman’s early general 
con sider ations on philo sophy, in particular the idea of constructional systems 
(2). Second, I will try to develop my thesis in the context of his later philoso-
phy of symbols and worldmaking (3). Finally I will come back to the question 
of epi stemology (4) and try to give an alternative account of what «critique of 
world making» might mean (5). My claim will be that this label points into the 
direction of a practical reflection comparable to Kant’s critique of reason or to 
Witt gen stein’s critique of language games, i. e., as a philosophy of world 
orient ation and world disclosure under the conditions of finiteness — a claim 
which, of course, does not include a «truth about Good man», but only suggests 
a certain way of ca tegorization.
2. Constructionalism and the idea of mapmaking
Goodman’s philosophical work contains many issues from quite diverse fields 
like ontology, logic, epistemology, symbol theory and aesthetics. It would be 
difficult to extract his conception of philosophy from this starting point. So 
what does he say about his notion of philosophy?
In the final chapter of Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sci­
ences, under the heading «A Reconception of Philosophy», we find the idea of 
a three-staged under taking that starts with the examination of symbols, then 
turns to their constitutive meaning for world dis closure, and finally results in 
a revision of philosophy (R, 164). The consider ations of Languages of Art, then, 
could be the first step of a project that continues with Ways of Worldmaking, 
and ends with the outline of a new notion of philo sophy. This notion, though, 
is presented as a certain epi stemological position called «constructionalism» 
(R, 166). In the follow ing, I claim that Good man’s thinking implicitly suggests 
a much more radically revised conception of philo sophy. Indeed, the label 
«epistemology» is misleading here, as the philo sophy of worldmaking should 
better be interpreted as a conception presupposing a primacy of practice. In 
order to show this, though, we have to go back to The Structure of Appearance 
and Problems and Projects.
One of the main motives in Goodman’s early work is his repudiation of 
the ideas of certainty and immediacy. The position that becomes apparent in 
The Structure of Appear ance seems to be the result: Goodman obviously rejects 
any epistemological founda tion alism in favor of an epistemological stance 
called pheno menalism. But the second sight shows that things are slightly more 
complicated. Goodman does develop a phenomenalistic system in his early 
work. Yet this does not mean that he supports phenomenalism as the right 
system of epistemology. Indeed, in the introduction to The Structure of Appear­
ance it is underlined that the frame of the con ception is the theory of construc-
tional systems which includes strong relativist and pluralist assumptions, in 
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particular the assumption that phenomenalism is only one of many possibilities 
of reconstruction (SA, il-l). His con ception must not be taken as an immediate 
expression of Good man’s philo so phical standpoint. He does not want to 
explain the world or give a fundament to knowledge. His aim is to systematize 
knowledge. The phenomenalist conception is rather an example of the philo-
sophical stance Good man takes. From the view point of the phenomenalist 
theory, the basic assumptions of this position are part of a meta theory (Hell-
mann 1977, xxvi f and SA, l).
What we have to ask, then, is what this metatheory, namely the theory of 
constructional systems implies. Goodman develops this theory in the first part 
of The Structure of Appear ance. A constructional system is a system of construc-
tional definitions, i. e., of definitions «introduced for explanatory purposes» (SA, 
3). Unlike a notational definition, a constructional de finition defines everyday 
or pre system atic ex pres sions while preserving their original interpretation. It 
serves to clarify the presystematic domain by reaching both economy (a reduc-
tion of primitive terms) and a systematic order (SA, 47f). «To economize and 
to systematize are the same» (SA, 48). In order to serve this purpose, a con-
structional de finition does not only have to fulfill formal requirements: «A 
con struc tional de finition is correct — apart from formal considerations — if 
the range of application of its definiens is the same as that of the definiendum. 
Nothing more is required than that the two expressions have identical exten-
sions» (SA, 3). This, in turn, calls for what Goodman labels «extensional iso-
morphism» (SA, 10). The picture that is construed does not simply reflect the 
presystem atic domain. But still it is restricted to the applic ations which are 
generally ac cepted as right in the original symbolic practice.
In «The Revision of Philosophy» Goodman explains this method as a mat-
ter of mapping: «The function of a constructional system», he writes, «is not 
to recreate experience but rather to map it» (PP, 15). Consequently, in a con-
struc tional definition the symbol «=df» is to be read as «is here to be mapped 
as» (PP, 18). Here we get a distinct idea of Goodman’s way of systematizing: 
to systematize is to simplify and organize a given domain for the sake of clari­
fication: The purpose of a system is not to re present the world (to make knowl-
edge available) but to arrange what we already know (to make knowledge 
serviceable). A map would be useless if it copied the world; and likewise, a mere 
reproduction of the world is no reasonable aim. Goodman describes the func-
tion of a map as follows:
A map is schematic, selective, con ventional, condensed, and uniform. And these 
character istics are virtues rather than defects. The map not only sum marizes, 
clarifies, and syste ma tizes, it often dis closes facts we could hardly learn im me-
diately from our ex plorations. We may make larger and more complicated 
maps or even three-dimen sional models in order to record more information; 
but this is not always to the good. For when our map be comes as large and in 
all other re spects the same as the territory mapped — and indeed long before 
this stage is reached — the purposes of a map are no longer served. (PP, 15)
Nelson Goodman's Conception of Philosophy Enrahonar 49, 2012  33
A map does not grasp what is already there. A good map systematizes a field 
and contributes to its disclosure. It delivers a perspective that allows us to deal 
with things; i. e., it brings a world into sight. So a map is a medium of world 
orientation. And insofar as mapping is the central goal of Goodman’s philoso-
phy, it is a philosophy of world disclosure and world orientation: It aims not 
at understanding the world in the first place, but at under standing our own 
ways of understanding (WW, 21f). Therefore it is justified to say that Good-
man’s conception of philosophy is close akin to Wittgenstein’s conception of 
philosophy as gram mar. Goodman’s idea of «mapmaking» can be interpreted 
as a variation of Witt gen stein’s idea of über sichtliche Darstellung — a term 
which can roughly be trans lated as surveyable represent ation1. In the conception 
of language games, the aim is to find repre sent ations that allow us to «know 
our way about»2. Like wise, Good man’s philo sophy of mapmaking does not 
aim at «a portrayal of the process of acquiring knowledge» or «the genesis [...] 
of ideas» (PP, 10). The criterion of truth does not apply: «The relevant ques-
tion about a system or a map is whether it is serviceable and accurate in the 
way intended» (PP, 16).
Below, I suggest that the conception of mapmaking reaches into Good-
man’s later thought which hence can be interpreted as a project of surveyable 
re pre sent ation in the sense described. In the philosophy of worldmaking, sym-
bols are taken as a condition of understanding: They neither grasp the world 
in itself nor obscure the sight, but make world views possible. Symbols consti-
tute the perspectives that allow reality to come into sight. In a slogan: World­
making is mapmaking.
3. Worldmaking as mapmaking
At first sight, it seems that constructional systems got lost in the later gen-
eral theory of symbols, as developed in Languages of Art. In actual fact, 
though, symbol systems are descendants of constructional systems. Just as 
the metatheory of The Structure of Appearance demands, a symbol system 
includes both its symbols and its interpretation (LA, 40 and Hellman 1977, 
XX). It is not an institution waiting to be described but a result of a recon-
struction — i. e., one recon struction out of many. Also, Good man’s ten-
dency to look down on everyday symbolic practice appears in quite a dif-
ferent light, given the pur pose of his philosophizing. He does not ignore the 
1. Cf. Wittgenstein 1953, § 122. The expression «übersichtliche Darstellung» produces a pro-
blem for any translation. Anscombe’s «perspicuous representation» has lately been replaced 
for «surveyable representation» by Hacker and Schulte: cf. Wittgenstein 2009, 252. The 
translation «bird’s eye view» — cf. Wittgenstein 1975, I.1 — is clearly wrong; and as far as 
«synoptic over view» points into the same direction it is no less problematic. In fact, «Dar-
stellung» alone is hard to translate as it is opposed to «Vor stellung» which corresponds to 
«representation». — Later, I will come back to this issue.
2. Cf. Wittgenstein 1953, § 123: «Ein philosophisches Problem hat die Form: Ich kenne mich 
nicht aus.» («A philosophical problem has the form: I don’t know my way about.»)
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prag matic or social dimension of sign use. Indeed this dimension is always 
present in the back ground. Only, his relation to everyday practice is deter-
mined by the purpose of clari fication.
In Goodman’s later work this methodology — the more developed form of 
the metatheory of The Structure of Appearance — often goes under the heading 
of nominalism. This label has given rise to many misunderstandings as it has 
regularly been interpreted as an epistemological or even metaphysical stance3. 
However, Goodman emphasizes again and again that his nominalism has a 
methodological sense. In his early writings we find the explanation that nomi-
nalism «does not involve excluding abstract entities, spirits, intimations of 
immortality, or anything of the sort; but requires only that whatever is admit-
ted as an entity at all be con strued as an individual» (PP, 157, emphasis added)4. 
So the concept of nominalism, here, has no ontological sense at all, it concerns 
the method of re construction exclusively; it is a technique. The idea is: In order 
to systematize well one should restrict oneself to individual elements5. What 
looks like onto logy at first sight turns out to be a rule of thumb for clarification 
purposes — a rule, by the way, to which Goodman more than once makes 
exceptions (LA, xiii).
So the explanations of nominalism in Languages of Art or Ways of World­
making have an exclusively methodological sense. They are usually short, and 
Good man more or less contents himself with reference to his earlier writings 
(LA, 156; WW, 10, 94-96 and 100f; MM, 29f). This might be one of the 
reasons why his nominalism has so often been mistaken for a meta physical 
doctrine. However, many elements of Goodman’s late pluralism become near-
ly unintelligible if one loses sight of its basic methodology and its practical 
purpose. The debate about starmaking (McCormick 1996, Scheffler 1999, 
Scheffler 2001) can serve as an example: It seems fair to discuss how a radical 
pluralism like Goodman’s can ever be justified; to many it seems that the idea 
of a «pluriverse» is completely counterintuitive and has to pro voke realist 
rejoinders. But a closer look shows that the whole debate might be beside the 
point: Goodman’s pluralism does not have an ontological sense at all, it does 
not want to be a «sweeping general doctrine» (MM, 43). It is hardly ever 
noticed how peculiar Good man’s contributions to this subject are: «I by no 
means insist that there are many worlds - or indeed any», he writes in Ways of 
World making (WW, 96). There is no fixed number of symbol worlds as a world 
is regarded as actual if a world description is recognized as right (WW, 94). 
3.  Shottenkirk (2009) argues that to understand Goodman’s philosophy one has to read 
Goodman’s work as a whole. In particular, the nominalism of The Strucure of Appearance 
had to be accounted for. For Shottenkirk, though, this means that Good man’s «Metaphysics 
is an explication of Goodman’s basic nominalist ontology and logic, and it is upon those 
principles that he builds his epi stemology» (ibid., vii).
4.  A bit further it says: «To explain nominalism we need to explain not what individuals are 
but rather what constitutes describing the world as com posed of them» (PP, 159).
5.  This is why Scheffler can speak of inscriptionalism instead: cf. Scheffler 1997, 6f. Also cf. 
SA, 46.
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Irrealism, Good man says, «is not one more doctrine [...] but is rather an atti-
tude of unconcern with most issues between such doctrines» (MM, 43; Good-
man 1996, 203f). Similarly, Goodman defends irrealism against Putnam’s 
«common sense realism» only insofar as «irrealism can by no means brook any 
acceptance of commonsense at face value but at most as only presystematic 
discourse urgent ly requiring critical examination and organization into well-
made versions» (Goodman 1996, 205). Ob viously, the idea of constructional 
systems is in the background here, and indeed the passage includes a reference 
to Goodman’s early work.
It should have become clear by now that Goodman’s later philosophy is 
still deeply in formed by the early idea of constructional systems. It is not so 
much a doctrine, a theory, but rather a technique of clarification, a practice that 
I suggest to call practice of perspicuous re presentation. In the following sec-
tions I will ask for some implic ations of this approach. My assumption is that 
some of the difficulties to do justice to Goodman’s project derive from the fact 
that he himself keeps using the language of epistemology. I will first make some 
remarks on the topic of epistemology in general and after that make a sugges-
tion how to understand the term «critique of world making».
4. The language of representation
In his paper «A world of individuals» Goodman writes that the philosopher’s 
«task is to interrelate, systematize, interpret, explain». Then he continues as 
fol lows: «He [sc. the philosopher] is driven not by practical needs but by an 
im practical desire to understand. He, too, will judge a system by how well it 
works; but a system works for him only to the extent that it clarifies» (PP, 169). 
Similarly, in Languages of Art, Goodman says, that the «primary purpose» of 
symbolizing was «cognition in and for it self». In this context, any practical, in 
particular communicative purposes are ex cluded: «[...] com mu ni cation is sec-
ondary to the appre hen sion and formulation of what is to be com municated» 
(LA, 258). — So rhetorically, the weight is clearly put on the cognitive dimen-
sion. The crucial point is: Goodman himself tends to describe his technique 
of world orientation by using the terms of epistemological theory.
This is what I want to discuss. Is it plausible to understand a project like 
Goodman’s as an epistemological project? The critique of theory of knowl edge 
in general is known since Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit and has been carried 
forward by authors like Heidegger, Wittgenstein or Merleau-Ponty. The prob-
lems are especially obvious in the case of foundationalism. But one might have 
a suspicion that this is only the tip of the iceberg: In this spirit, Charles Taylor 
claims that epistemology does not have to be «overcome» in its foundational-
ist form only as the core of the problem is the repre sentationalism implied in 
the idea of a theory of knowl edge (Taylor 1987, 9f). According to Taylor, the 
critique of epi stemology has its fundament in the rejection of the modern 
premise that there are «ideas» that have intentional content and point to the 
world, whereas Kant shows that it is unintelligible how anything could have 
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these properties all at once. Knowl edge cannot be separated from practical 
standpoints, it has its ultimate fundament in the «agent’s knowl edge» (Taylor 
1987, 10f). But if this is right, then the idea of epistemology becomes prob-
lematic as such. The idea of privileged represent ations mirroring the world is 
not specifically foundationalist, like Rorty suggests; it is not restricted to the 
ideology of knowl edge atoms (Rorty 1979). In actual fact, the possib ility to 
differentiate wrong and right re presentations from a privileged standpoint beyond 
human practice is blocked in general. If epistemology is an attempt to catch up 
with everyday epistemic judg ments, to solve the question of reliable knowl edge 
by theory, then epistemology has come to an end. At the bottom of world 
re presen tations we will not find world representations more fundamental, but 
in articulate human practice (Taylor 1987, 14). This practice, though — this is 
one of the central insights in the late Wittgenstein — can neither be over-
viewed nor re produced in theory as it is subtle and fine-spun as a spider’s web 
(Wittgenstein 1953, § 106). This is why we cannot distance our selves from 
our own being­in­the­world, as expressed in the language of phenomenology. 
The only thing we can ask for is an analysis for the purpose of orientation and 
dis closure. The basic mistake of representa tionalist epistemology is that it does 
ask for more. But in fact, we cannot judge world descriptions from a scien-
tific, unengaged position. Philosophy cannot deliver fixed criteria but only help 
to make considered judgments, invent concepts, explicate the back ground of 
knowledge, help us to know our way about. Its task is not to represent cogni-
tive processes but to make maps within the practice of under stand ing. All we 
can do is to support epistemic practice.
If this is what Goodman does — if it is right to describe his project as one 
of making maps and surveyable representations —, then his emphasis on the 
«primacy of cognition» is wholly misleading. The primacy of clarification 
includes a primacy of human practice and its purposes. When Goodman 
describes his philosophy as «examin ation and comparison of the ways we make 
what we make [...] and of the criteria we use in judging what we make» (MM, 
43), he cannot take a standpoint out side practice but only within. The notion 
of symbol, introduced as a «very general and color less term» (LA, xi), should 
then be taken as a philosophical instrument that does not refer to representa-
tions of reality or even «ideas» in Locke’s sense. In particular, it does not serve 
to differentiate right renderings from wrong ones6. The German «Darstellung» 
that Wittgenstein uses can help to grasp this point. Unlike the term «Vorstel-
lung» (usually corresponding to «representation»), «Darstellung» refers to a 
practice of the forming presentations that has standards of its own and is not 
bound to given facts whatsoever. This explains why the criteria of rightness that 
Goodman mentions — e. g., correctness, coher ence, purposefulness and «along 
with truth, standards of accepta bility that some times supple ment or even com-
6. This is especially obvious in the fact that Goodman never describes criteria to sort out wrong 
symbol izations. Rather, whenever he speaks of world versions he speaks of right symbol-
izations. LA, 3f.
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pete with truth where it applies, or re place truth for non declarative ren der ings» 
(WW, 110) — cannot count as epi stemological standards but are criteria «we 
use», i. e., criteria of everyday’s human practice.
The assumption of «multiple actual worlds» (WW, 2, emphasis added) 
which is central to Goodman’s pluralism relates to an assumption of a variety 
of symbolic practices with specific rules and criteria that the philosopher can 
never hope to exhaust. One might say: Human practice is no subject in Good-
man’s philosophy as he does not distance himself from practice but adopts a 
practical standpoint. His attempt is to clarify practice from a stand point of 
finiteness. In the last section, I examine the project of a critique of world-
making in this sense a bit more closely. It has already been shown that Good-
man’s project can be read as a conception of world disclosure (Ortland 2001, 
Seel 1993). I will focus on the idea of critique as a matter of world orientation.
5. Beyond representation
Goodman’s thinking can be understood as an effort of mapping, built upon a 
method of über sichtliche Darstellung. One could say: His philo sophy of world-
making is a philo sophy of world orientation in the corset of epi stemology. But 
as the idea of looking at the epistemic practice from the side is dropped, the aim 
can no longer be to find «privileged representations». Rather, it is an attempt 
to clarify the ongoing practice in order to support «considered judgments» 
(Elgin 1996). The purpose of Goodman’s philo sophy is orientation and clar-
ification. In this respect, his philo sophy is close to Wittgenstein’s and, maybe 
less obviously, to Kant’s.
Kant’s thinking is motivated by the observation that the world cannot be 
experienced as a totality, that the unity of the whole can only be an «idea». The 
antinomy of the two perspectives of free dom and nature is the most well known 
motive in this context; it is the starting point of Kant’s philosophy. The result 
is not a theory but a critique of knowledge: i. e., a differ entiation of domains 
of judg ments, each having its own rules and criteria7. Such an approach does 
not aim at epistemology but at an orientation in thinking8.
If the notion of a «critique of worldmaking» has a Kantian sense, then it 
should be possible to find, at least, hints into this direction. Indeed, Good-
man’s «irreconcilable con flict of world versions» plays quite a similar role as 
Kant’s antinomy9. It is the starting point that opens up a critical (as opposed 
to metaphysical) per spec tive: Goodman’s turn from truth to rightness does not 
only derive from a modi fication of standards. It implies, before all, a pluraliza­
7. The most radical interpretation of this Kantian thought is to be found in Jean-François 
Lyotard’s Le Différend. It would be interesting to compare Lyotard’s account of a différend 
to Goodman’s account of irreconcilable conflicts: Lyotard 1983, 9 and WW, 109-116. For 
an attempt see Leeten 2010, 243-248.
8. This aspect in Kant’s philosophy is developed in Kant (1786): «Was heißt: sich im Denken 
orientieren?».
9. Cf. WW, Ch. VII and, with reference to Kant’s antinomies, MM, 32.
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tion of standards and the idea of a multitude of domains. But where a plural-
ity of criteria is allowed, the standards of science are some among many others 
and the philosopher loses his privileged position. Which standards have to be 
applied cannot be decided by reflection alone — like any vote for a particular 
metaphysical stance, e. g., Quine’s vote for physical ism (Quine 1981), seems 
to presuppose. The conflict between monism and pluralism, here, is not sim-
ply a conflict of two epistemological ap proaches; it is a conflict between an 
epistemo logical approach and an approach that does not claim privileged 
knowledge any longer but has become a part of human practice. Philo sophy, 
then, does not serve the purpose of discovering truths about the world but 
rather of handling our understanding of the world.
Considering that this account is right: The general theory of symbols then 
should indeed better be understood as a practical conception, akin to positions 
of world orientation or world disclosure. Many aspects of Goodman’s thinking 
should become clearer if interpreted in a non-epistemological frame. But this 
is not all: If Goodman’s philosophy is a philosophy of practice in the sense 
de scribed, then it has its value not in itself. The crucial question would be what 
we make of it. As a system of categorization the symbol theory would be a 
means of thinking, namely an instrument for clarification purposes, and its 
value would show itself in its use alone. Goodman himself writes: «For a cat-
egorical system, what needs to be shown is not that it is true but what it can 
do» (WW, 129). The general theory of symbols is a categorical system. So the 
question cannot be whether it is a true doctrine but what we can do with it. 
Such a reception of Goodman’s philosophy is still to be explored.
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